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National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting P. FCC
By H. THOMAS HICKS*
[Fjreedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the
contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to
operate in an effective forum-whether it be a public park, a
schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and tele-
vision frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of
communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed.
And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently
held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract
right to be free.from censorship, but also the right of an individ-
ual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the ex-
pression of his views.'
Understanding the structure and ownership of the communi-
cations industry in the United States is essential to an effective
public policy seeking to promote basic First Amendment objec-
tives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
charged with the primary responsibility of furthering this pol-
icy,2 acted recently in the area of cross-owned3 newspa-
per-broadcast combinations. In so doing it has extended its
scope of regulation, indirectly at least, to an area not tradition-
ally subject to FCC regulation-the print media.
Under the FCC's statutory mandate to promote the "public
interest, convenience and necessity"' it has frequently adopted
* Member, Class of 1979.
1. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193 (1973) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
2. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(a), 154(i), 154(j), 301, 303(g), 309(a), 309(d)(1), 402(a)
(1976).
3. Cross-ownership refers to the common ownership of more than one type of
media source in one locality. This is distinguished from group ownership, which indi-
cates common ownership of more than one of the same type of media outlet in the
same area. For the purposes of this note, cross-ownership is used to refer to newspa-
per-broadcast combinations.
4. In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations,
Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975), reconsidered 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Second Report and Order].
5. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
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measures designed to prevent undue concentration of media
interests.6 A fundamental purpose of those measures is the
promotion of First Amendment ideals and the encouragement
of diverse viewpoints expressed through the media.
Equally important to broadcast regulation is the FCC's de-
sire to promote economic competition within the industry.' In
addition, the FCC must balance the need for intellectual and
economic diversity against the necessities of industry stability
and the broadcasters' reasonable expectation of license re-
newal. These are important factors that provide incentives for
the large scale investments necessary in the broadcast indus-
try.
The antagonism between the First Amendment and the need
for governmental regulation in this area has generated much
debate over the means by which the media should be regu-
lated.' Three approaches have been used in the past. First, the
FCC has dealt with individual abuses on a case-by-case basis.
Second, the problem has sometimes been treated as an anti-
trust matter under the jurisdiction of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice. Finally, the FCC has promulgated a
formal rule of general applicability subject to waiver in appro-
priate cases.'
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'0 the Supreme Court
laid the foundation for the issues illustrating the purpose and
meaning of the First Amendment in the broadcast media con-
text. The Court recognized that the print and broadcast media
are distinct forms of mass communication and require differ-
ent forms of protection and regulation." Implicit in the Court's
decision in Red Lion is the notion that regulation of the broad-
cast industry should operate to maximize the diversity of view-
points aired.12 Difficulty arises, however, because the new rule,
6. See Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1051 n.4 (1975).
7. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
8. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213, 237.
9. See 47 CFR § 73.240 (1979).
10. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Red Lion v. FCC].
11. "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or pub-
lish." Id. at 388.
12. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount... . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to so-
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by restricting newspaper-broadcast combinations, indirectly
impinges on the newspaper owners' First Amendment right to
publish.
This note offers an overview of the FCC's new rule, including
an analysis of its subsequent judicial review. The first step is a
general examination of the nature and scope of the pre-ex-
isting multiple ownership rules. Special attention will be paid
to the statutory grant under which they were promulgated and
the policy bases on which they rest. A critique of National Cit-
izens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC 3 follows, in which
the new rule was challenged in the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia on constitutional and procedural
grounds. Finally, the note will examine the Supreme Court's
review of the National Citizens Committee case 4 and its rea-
soning in upholding this new extension of FCC authority.
I
The Rule and Rulemaking Proceeding
In 1970 the FCC issued its Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemakings and proposed rules. The proposed rules con-
tained both prospective and retroactive provisions. The pro-
spective provision would have banned the issuance of a license
for a radio or television station to any applicant who directly or
indirectly owned, operated or controlled a daily newspaper in
the community to be served by the broadcast station. In addi-
tion, any broadcaster who acquired or established a local daily
newspaper would be required to give up its broadcast license
within one year after acquiring or establishing the newspaper.
The retroactive provision of the proposed rules required di-
vestiture by all broadcasters who indirectly controlled newspa-
pers under the newly created criteria. Thus, any existing
broadcaster affiliated with a local daily newspaper would have
been required to divest itself of either the broadcast station or
the newspaper within five years after adoption of the rule.
cial, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."
Id. at 390.
13. 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
14. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
15. In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Sta-
tions, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing].
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In the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the FCC rec-
ognized the broad implications of the proposed rules and the
fact that it had "insufficient information" on the matter to
make a final judgment.16  As a result, comments and legal
briefs were solicited to assist the FCC in making a careful ex-
amination of the matter. 7
Following the consideration of the voluminous written rec-
ord and three days of oral argument, the FCC announced its
decision in its Second Report and Order." In this report, the
FCC asserted that it had the authority under the Communica-
tions Act to promulgate the rules as proposed and rejected the
constitutional argument that the rules violated the broadcast-
ers' and publishers' First Amendment rights.' 9 It then dis-
cussed separately the prospective and retroactive provisions of
the rules.
The FCC decided to issue the prospective portion of the rule
relating to the denial of new broadcast licenses as proposed in
the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.2 0 The FCC
reached a different conclusion, however, with respect to the
retroactive provisions of the rules. It found that "additional
public interest considerations" had to be weighed in judging
the desirability of divestiture and its consequences. 2 1 The FCC
16. Id. at 340. In particular the FCC expressed its "substantial concern" about the
possible adverse effects of divestiture. Id. at 348.
17. Id. The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking spanned an extensive and
time-consuming proceeding which extended over a five-year period and in which over
200 parties participated. Id. Among the parties filing comments were the National As-
sociation of Broadcasters, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, several citizens' groups, and a number
of broadcasters and newspaper publishers. Numerous studies were conducted, and
extensive documentation and reports were submitted to the FCC. See Second Report
and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1090-94 (1975). Topics covered by these studies were the
economic consequences of divestiture, the effects of common ownership on competi-
tion, the effects of common ownership on station performance, and the diversity of
existing media (including the extent of media affiliation). Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d at 349.
18. 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
19. Id. at 1048-50. The FCC reasoned that it had authority to adopt the proposed
rule by virtue of the Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
20. Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1074-78.
21. Among factors not taken into consideration at the time the new rule was origi-
nally proposed was the probability of station sales to outside interests, resulting in a
reduction of local ownership and involvement of owners in management. The FCC
also expressed concern regarding the disruption of service to the public that would
inevitably follow a break in continuity of ownership, especially where the new owner
lacked familiarity with the community. The FCC demonstrated a reluctance to precip-
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thus decided not to compel divestiture of all newspa-
per-broadcast combinations, as was originally proposed, and
instead adopted a more limited divestiture order confined to a
narrower category of applicants.
The FCC's decision not to order universal divestiture was
based in part on its own staff report, which showed that news-
paper-affiliated television stations had demonstrated "statisti-
cally significant superiority" in the areas of local news and
other non-entertainment programming when compared to
other television stations.2 3 The FCC also noted that many of
the stations that would have been required to divest had estab-
lished "a long record of service to the public."24 A number had
been forerunners in the early years of broadcasting at the time
when there was little hope for great financial gain in the indus-
try. Additionally, these stations had brought to broadcasting a
journalistic tradition rather than an interest only in entertain-
ment.25
The FCC also recognized evidence that indicated
across-the-board divestiture would compel many sales at sub-
stantially below market value, resulting in major losses to the
industry and significant "local economic dislocations."" More-
over, demands for equity capital would have an adverse effect
on available working capital and thus affect the quality of pro-
gramming service.27 Finally, the FCC noted that universal di-
vestiture would "reduce local ownership" because "many sales
would have to be to outside interests" who were neither famil-
iar with nor concerned with the local community.
The record before the FCC showed that the number of al-
ready available publications and broadcast stations was not
only large but increasing.2 9 Moreover, the record indicated
itate local economic dislocations as a possible result of the vast demand for equity
capital, rising interest rates, and depressed selling prices. Id. at 1078.
22. Only the "most egregious" cases were required to divest. This occurred in
communities where the only newspaper and television station, or the only newspaper
and radio station in a market not served by a television station, were commonly
owned. Id. at 1080. At the time of the Second Report and Order some 16 of these com-
binations were in existence.
23. Id. at 1078 n.26.
24. Id. at 1078.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1068, 1078.
28. Id. at 1078.
29. Id. at 1060-61, 1073-74.
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that there was a downward trend in the number of newspa-
per-broadcast affiliations as a result of normal market forces
and therefore little need of artificial regulatory adjustment. 0
The FCC also recognized as an important point that the man-
agement of affiliated newspaper-broadcast combinations was
often separate, including independent reporting and editorial
departments and policies." More importantly, however, the
FCC found no allegation that affiliated newspapers and broad-
cast stations had "committed any specific noncompetitive
acts."32
Based on its expertise in the area and the factual record de-
veloped before it, the FCC concluded that it was not in the pub-
lic interest to order wholesale divestiture of all existing
newspaper-broadcast combinations. It reasoned that "a mere
hoped for gain in diversity is not enough [to sanction] disrup-
tion for the industry and hardship for individual owners" that
would follow an across-the-board divestiture order.
Having said that our primary concern is diversity in. pro-
gramming service, we have analyzed the question of requiring
full-scale divestiture under standards and with regard for con-
siderations which are relevant under our broad public interest
mandate. . . . After reviewing the record in this context, we
believe that because of the disruption and losses which could
be expected to attend divestiture-resulting in losses or dimi-
nution of service to the public-divestiture should be limited to
use in only the most egregious cases.3 4
Following the Second Report and Order, several parties filed
petitions for reconsideration or clarification. The FCC denied
the petitions and formally terminated the proceeding.
II
Historical Background
A. Overview of Multiple Ownership Rules
Since the time of the Radio Act of 192736 Congress and the
30. Id. at 1061, 1080 n.29.
31. Id. at 1059-69, 1089.
32. Id. at 1072.
33. Id. at 1078.
34. Id. at 1080.
35. In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Authorship of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 53 F.C.C.2d 589 (1975).
36. Ch. 169, §§ 1-3, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1102
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FCC have had reservations about the prospect of individuals
having influence in too many media outlets. The basic problem
has been defining the level at which such concentration of con-
trol becomes too great. While the actual number of broadcast
stations under common control has in the past served as a
baseline guide in drafting multiple ownership regulations,
other factors have been considered as well, such as geographi-
cal distribution and the qualitative character of the multiple
owner.
The "Chain Broadcasting Regulations,"" introduced in 1941,
were directed at the two major networks existing at that time,
CBS and NBC. The purpose of these regulations was to check
the networks' influence over their affiliates and to moderate
their influence on both local and national markets." The regu-
lations were challenged by both CBS and NBC and were up-
held in both instances by the Supreme Court.3 1 More recently,
the FCC also adopted the Prime Time Access Rule,4 0 which
was primarily intended to pare down the networks' dominance
of the station-network relationship.
At approximately the same time as the "Chain Broadcasting
(1934)) successor to the Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, §§ 1-10, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) was the
first Federal legislation to reflect the existence of broadcasting as an industry. The Act
is essentially the same legislation under which broadcasting and all other radio serv-
ices in America operate today, although it has since been incorporated into the Com-
munications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1976).
37. FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting (Order No. 37, Dkt. No. 5060) (1941). See
47 U.S.C. § 15 3(p) (1976).
38. The Commission attached the "Chain Broadcasting Regulations" to its Report.
Six regulations concerned the station-network relationship, such as affiliates' right to
reject network programs. The remaining two regulations pertained to ownership and
required divestiture by NBC of one of its two networks and of one station in a commu-
nity in which it operated two broadcast facilities.
39. The networks' challenge to the Commission's regulations originally reached
the Supreme Court in CBS, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942) and NBC v. United
States, 316 U.S. 447 (1942). In these cases the Supreme Court held that the networks
could challenge the Commission regulations under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) prior to actual
agency enforcement of the regulations against a network affiliate. The Court reached
the merits of the challenges in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), and held that
the Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in promulgating the "Chain
Broadcasting Regulations." Id. at 224. NBC thereupon divested itself of its Blue Net-
work in compliance with the regulations. The new owner of this network changed its
name to the American Broadcasting Company (ABC).
40. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1978). With a few exceptions, the Prime Time Access
Rule forbids the networks to feed more than three hours of prime time programming
(7-11 p.m. Eastern Time and Pacific Time, 6-10 p.m. Central Time and Mountain Time)
to affiliates. A much modified version of the rule was upheld in National Ass'n of In-
dependent TV Producers and Distributors v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Regulations" were under fire, the FCC promulated its "duop-
oly" rules, originally proscribing common ownership of more
than one FM station in a single market." Shortly thereafter,
similar restrictions were placed on television4 2 and AM sta-
tions.43 In the late 1960's the FCC extended its "duopoly" rules,
prohibiting a single owner from acquiring more than one full-
time broadcast station, whether AM, FM, or television, in a sin-
gle market." Along somewhat similar lines, the FCC recently
proposed limiting the number of stations on a state-wide basis.
In 1975, the FCC proposed prohibiting multiple ownership of
more than four stations within a single state.4 5 This proposal is
clearly arbitrary, considering the vast differences in size
among both states and stations. The FCC, however, main-
tained that a simple, easily-defined standard was nevertheless
necessary. 6
In addition to the "duopoly" rules, which regulate ownership
primarily on the basis of geographical location, the FCC placed
a ceiling on the absolute number of stations an individual en-
terprise may own; in 1944, the ceiling was set at five television
stations. Nine years later it limited the number of AM, FM,
and television stations which could be under common control
to seven, seven, and five, respectively.48
Along with the relatively simple limitations on the number of
national or local media outlets an enterprise may own, Con-
41. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 5 Fed.
Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940).
42. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 6 Fed.
Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (1941).
43. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed.
Reg. 16065 (1943).
44. In re Amendment of Sections 73.75, 73.240, and 73.636 of the FCC's Rules Relat-
ing to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, First
Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970) [hereinafter cited as First Report and Order].
45. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 54 F.C.C.2d 331, 40 Fed. Reg. 31632 (1975).
46. Id. at 333.
47. Rules Governing Broadcast Services Other than Standard Broadcast, 9 Fed.
Reg. 5542 (1944). The FCC amended this ceiling to promote UHF television by allowing
common ownership of seven television stations, no more than five of which may be
VHF facilities. See In re Amendment of Section 3.636 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership of Television Broadcast Stations, Report
and Order, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954). The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to set
numerical limits on station ownership to avoid undue concentration of media owner-
ship in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
48. In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Report
and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order].
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gress and the FCC have prohibited some classes of individuals
from acquiring interests in broadcast stations. These policies
have recently become the subject of needed reevaluation.
For example, 47 U.S.C. § 310 generally prohibits alien owner-
ship of American broadcasting interests. Included in this sec-
tion are broadcast as well as non-broadcast stations (such as
microwave relays). The purpose of the section is to guard
against the possibility that in time of war an alien may use the
station in a way contrary to the country's interest. Section 310
appears to impose an outright prohibition on alien ownership
of such broadcasting interests. However, the section has re-
ceived a liberal construction from the FCC and now contains a
number of exceptions. Section 310(b) (3) permits an alien to
own up to twenty percent of a station's stock directly. 9 In ad-
dition, a parent company which owns stock in a subsidiary op-
erating corporation may be more than twenty-five percent
alien-owned if the FCC does not find that "the public interest
will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license."s0
The FCC has been very reluctant to make such findings. In
Letter to Banque de Paris et Des Pays Bas, the FCC permitted
a French bank to acquire nearly forty percent of the stock of a
parent corporation which operated a broadcast station subsidi-
ary.51
The FCC has also been quite liberal with respect to alien
ownership of cable systems. In GRC Cablevision Inc., a cable
television station license was granted to a subsidiary corpora-
tion, the parent company of which was slightly more than fifty
percent alien-owned.52
In addition, section 310 does not apply to debt transactions as
it does to equity transactions. Thus, an alien corporation may
make loans to an American broadcast system so long as they
are secured by assets other than stock in the broadcast corpo-
ration. This fact, coupled with the fact that no restrictions are
imposed upon aliens holding management positions in Ameri-
can broadcast stations, makes it possible for a foreign interest
to exert significant control. The foreign corporation could own
twenty-five percent or more of the American station's stock,
49. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (3) (1976).
50. Id. at § 310(b) (4).
51. 6 F.C.C.2d 418 (1966).
52. 47 F.C.C.2d 467 (1974).
No. 3]1 553
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make unlimited loans to it, and place its own personnel in man-
agement positions.
Another area in which the FCC has chosen to impose multi-
ple ownership restrictions is in the area of station ownership of
advertising sales representations. Many broadcast stations
have found it profitable to engage in advertising sales repre-
sentation for other stations. Once a station has invested in an
effective advertising representation division, the cost of ex-
tending the service to other stations is negligible. As a result,
many stations have set up regional or local representation divi-
sions.
The FCC recognized the potential for abuse of a system
where one station might fix advertising rates for other stations
in its market. Accordingly, in Golden West Broadcasters Inc.,
the FCC banned advertising sales representation for a station
by a firm that wholly or partially owned a competing station in
the same area."
A third kind of restriction exists as to the type of individual
or corporation that is permitted to hold a broadcast license. If
the trust department of a bank directly or indirectly owns more
than one percent of the outstanding voting stock of a station, it
is deemed to have an interest in it. Likewise, a mutual fund is
considered to have an interest in a station if it owns more than
one percent of the stock or the station's officers or directors are
representatives of the mutual fund. As a result, if a bank or
mutual fund invests substantial sums in a number of stations,
it will be treated as having interests in each of them, possibly
in violation of the multiple ownership rules.
Recently the FCC decided to back down from a proposal to
strengthen the multiple ownership limitations. In 1965 the
FCC proposed allowing common ownership of only three tele-
vision stations within the fifty largest television markets.54 The
response was intensely negative, and the FCC eventually with-
drew its proposal.5
Finally, in 1941, the FCC considered the question of
cross-owned newspaper-broadcast combinations and chose
not to adopt a per se ban." The FCC decided to prevent undue
concentration of control on a case-by-case basis rather than by
53. 16 F.C.C.2d 918 (1969).
54. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1609 (1965).
55. Report and Order, 12 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1501 (1968).
56. Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 1508, 3302-03 (1941).
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rule.57 Thus, newspaper owners as such have never been dis-
qualified from holding broadcast licenses. The FCC has ex-
tended the multiple ownership rules into a variety of untested
areas. Moreover, it has done so, with the support of the courts,
for reasons that are far less compelling than the weighty policy
arguments presented by the diversity issue in the instant case.
B. Policy Bases for Multiple Ownershp Regulation
The traditional analysis of broadcast regulation begins with
the premise that the public is the owner of the airwaves and is
justified in determining how this resource is to be allocated."
Congress has spoken in this regard by enacting the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, which provides for licensing and operating
of the frequencies in the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity.5 9 What constitutes this standard is left for the most
part to the informed discretion of the FCC.
Related to the foregoing assumption is the concept of "scar-
city." The airwaves are not only a valuable public commodity,
they are also limited. As only a finite number of licenses can
be granted, those who choose to use the airwaves can be sub-
jected to regulation. In recent years, however, technological
developments have threatened the "scarcity" rationale. For
example, as of 1975 there were approximately ten million cable
television (CATV) subscribers in the United States, or 15 per-
cent of all television households.60 While over-the-air broad-
casting is limited by a finite number of frequencies, CATV is
not. CATV signals are carried by a coaxial cable to subscrib-
ers' homes. Typically such new systems can carry about
twenty television channels, but theoretically that capacity can
at least be tripled. In addition, to "fill" each of these channels,
a CATV system can be intertwined with other CATV systems
and "import" signals from various parts of the nation. Thus,
from the public interest point of view, CATV will increasingly
infringe upon the "scarcity" rationale for regulation and pro-
vide the public with an almost unlimited choice in program-
ming. As a result, the "media differences-captive audience"
57. Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, Notice of Dismissal of Proceediig, 9
Fed. Reg. 702 (1944). In addition, the court of appeals accepted the Commission's "gen-
eral policy of encouraging diverse ownership of all mass media of communication."
Clarksburg Publ. Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 517 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
58. See FRANCOIs, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 290, 291 (1975).
59. Ch. 652, § 309, 48 Stat. 1085 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976)).
60. B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 135 (1975).
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theory and the fiduciary concept theory have been advanced
to justify regulation of the broadcast media.e'
The "media differences" theory comprises several elements.
First, it includes the notion that once the radio or television set
is turned on, the listener or viewer becomes a "captive audi-
ence." The reader of the print media, however, once having de-
cided to pick up the book or newspaper, may then decide
which items to read and which ones to disregard. The user of
the electronic medium is not afforded so many affirmative
choices. Once having decided to "tune in," he is more at the
behest of the medium itself.62 In acknowledging such a notion
Chief Justice Burger has said:
The Commission [FCC] is also entitled to take into account
the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers con-
stitute a "captive" audience. . . . The "captive" nature of the
broadcast audience was recognized as early as 1924, when
Commerce Secretary Hoover remarked at the Fourth National
Radio Conference that "the radio listener does not have the
same option that the reader of publications has-to ignore ad-
vertising in which he is not interested-and he may resent its
invasion on his set.63
The fiduciary concept, most recently discussed by the
Supreme Court in the Red Lion decision," is founded on the
concept that a licensee is only a trustee or fiduciary for the
public and that First Amendment protection does not prohibit
the government from requiring certain public interest conces-
sions from the licensee, such as sharing his frequency with
others. In doing so he is furthering the public's interest in its
right to know, the highest First Amendment principle of all.
Finally, a justification for continued regulation of television
can be posited from the assertion that it is the most powerful of
all mass media, that its impact is as yet unknown, and that
therefore it should be subject to more control.6 6 If such were
the case, however, might not the converse be true? Should not
61. See FRANqOis, supra note 58, at 293.
62. Id. at 292.
63. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973).
64. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
65. Whether one agrees with this interpretation of the public interest standard is
largely dependent on one's point of view. It can be argued that the public interest
would be better served by allowing licensees more freedom of expression and freedom
from governmental regulation.
66. See Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). Ac-
cord, Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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radio, being a less powerful medium, be deregulated?6 7 In fact,
at the present time, the empirical data necessary for such a
comparison is not available.
IV
Constitutional and Statutory Considerations
A. The First Amendment in the Context of the Print and Electronic
Media
The application of the First Amendment to the broadcast and
print media fluctuates. The uncertainties and inconsistencies
in this area of the law are a result of the Supreme Court's dif-
fering application of the First Amendment to the two media.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo" and the now famous
Red Lion case," two recent pronouncements by the Court on
the respective First Amendment functions of the print and
broadcast media, illustrate the dichotomy.
In the Miami Herald case the Supreme Court held a Florida
right-of-reply statute unconstitutional.70 The statute provided
that any candidate for nomination or election to a public office
whose personal character or official record had been attacked
had a right to demand that the newspaper print, without cost,
any response the candidate wished to make to the newspaper
charges.7 Failure to comply with the statute was a violation of
the Florida criminal code and constituted a first-degree misde-
meanor.7 2
The proponents of the Florida law argued that the statute
was not an abridgment of the newspaper publishers' First
Amendment rights. Rather, they argued that it was consistent
with changing conditions and that its broader implications
were more protective of the First Amendment's emphasis on
open debate of vital public issues.73
The argument advanced by the proponents of the law may be
summarized as follows: At the time the Founding Fathers
drafted the Bill of Rights the press was a very different entity
than it is today. Entry into the field was inexpensive; leaflets
67. See FRANiois, supra note 58, at 293.
68. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
69. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
70. 418 U.S. at 258.
71. Id. at 244.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 247-48.
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and pamphleteers were common and provided a meaningful al-
ternative to newspapers. In essence, a true marketplace of
ideas7 4 existed where public debate on matters of importance
could be carried on in a significant, practical manner." How-
ever, technological factors have reduced the number of news-
papers, and competition among them, so that they no longer
adequately represent the broad range of public opinion."
Newspaper chains, national papers, national news and wire
services, and one-paper cities are the dominant fact of the in-
dustry." The power of the media, the power to inform, is con-
centrated in the hands of a few, who have the ability to
manipulate and influence popular opinion. From a practical
perspective, the high price of entry into the market makes it
unavailable for those with unpopular or minority viewpoints.
Only the government is in a position to remedy the situation,
and it must act affirmatively to ensure impartiality on the part
of the press and to assure fairness and access for the public."
The Court, per Chief Justice Burger, unanimously rejected
this argument, and ruled the statute unconstitutional. The
Court relied on traditional First Amendment analysis, reason-
ing that prior holdings and the sensitive nature of the First
Amendment barred the imposition of any form of compelled
access upon the press." Second, the Court found that while a
responsible and responsive press is a desirable goal, this goal
was not mandated by the Constitution and could not be legis-
lated. 0 Third, because editors would be forced to make reply
space available for controversial issues, the statute would stifle
coverage of such matters and frustrate the end to which it was
addressed.8 ' Lastly, the statute failed to meet First Amend-
74. The concept of a marketplace of ideas is discussed in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. II,
at 15-52 (1859).
75. 418 U.S. at 248.
76. In 1973 only 5.4 percent of newspaper firms had direct competition in the same
city. While the number of large metropolitan newspapers has been steadily declining
since 1900, circulation of daily newspapers had increased at a faster rate than total U.S.
population until the last half-century. Moreover, the number of cities with daily news-
papers has risen during that same period as the number of cities with two or more
dailies has steadily fallen. B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 49, 61-62,
78 (1975).
77. 418 U.S. at 249.
78. Id. at 249-51.
79. Id. at 254 n.20.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 257.
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ment standards because it conflicted with the editorial func-
tion of newspapers to select what material will be printed.8 2
Although the Court rejected the access argument in the con-
text of the right-of-reply statute, it indicated that there are
other areas where a publisher may be compelled to provide
space for critical reply. In a concurring opinion, Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justice Rehnquist, emphasized that the Court's
opinion evidenced no view on the constitutionality of statutes
that allow plaintiffs, who are able to prove defamatory false-
hood, the remedy of requiring a retraction." Thus, the Court
may under different circumstances hold such statutes to be
constitutional.
Analogous to the Florida right-of-reply statute held uncon-
stitutional in Miami Herald is the FCC's Fairness Doctrine,
which requires that each side of public issues be discussed on
broadcast stations and be given fair and balanced coverage.
Two provisions of the doctrine provide access time under cer-
tain circumstances. The "personal attack" provision requires
that when a personal attack has been made on a party dealing
with a public issue, the individual must be afforded an opportu-
nity to answer the charges. The "equal time" portion provides
that where one candidate for office is endorsed in an editorial
by a broadcast station, reply time must be made available to
the other candidate.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC," the Supreme Court
rejected the broadcast industry's challenge to the Fairness
Doctrine on traditional First Amendment grounds. The Court.
held that although the broadcast medium clearly enjoys First
Amendment protection, the differences in the character of the
print medium and broadcast medium mandate differing First
Amendment standards." While in Miami Herald the Court re-
stricted public access to newspapers in favor of the publishers'
82. Id. at 258. It is also important to take cognizance of the fact that the Court did
not reject the characterization of the press as noncompetitive and uniquely powerful.
Instead, the Court acknowledged these facts as true, yet held that the First Amend-
ment prohibited governmental intrusion into the editorial process. Id. at 248-51, 258.
83. Id. at 258.
84. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-78 (1969) for historical development of
the Fairness Doctrine.
85. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1934) (as amended 1952, 1959, 1972 and 1974) (originally
enacted as Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123,
73.300, 73.398 & 73.679 (1976).
86. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
87. Id. at 386.
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editorial freedom," the Court in Red Lion stressed the public's
right to know. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 9 Scarcity
of the airwaves, the Court argued, justified the FCC licensing
scheme that produced this result.9 0
The Fairness Doctrine, however, has been the subject of in-
creasing criticism in subsequent judicial pronouncements.
Chief Judge Bazelon, of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in his dissenting opinion in Brandy-
wine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, argued persuasively that
a complete re-examination of the Fairness Doctrine is in or-
der.92 He asserted that the FCC's fears of a broadcast monop-
oly may be outdated." His argument, which is analogous to
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miami Herald, was that the
Fairness Doctrine may well effect an overall silencing of the
public debate it was intended to encourage.
Following the Red Lion decision, the Supreme Court further
defined the role of the First Amendment in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee." The
Court ruled that neither the First Amendment nor the Commu-
nications Act requires broadcasters to accept paid political an-
nouncements.96 In doing so, it overruled a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that had held
that "a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in viola-
tion of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid
announcements are accepted."" The Supreme Court based its
reasoning on the fact that the broadcasters had accepted com-
mercial advertisements but refused to do the same for editorial
advertisements. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
subsequently declared that "Congress intended to permit pri-
88. 418 U.S. at 258.
89. 395 U.S. at 390. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens'
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 948 (1976).
90. 395 U.S. at 388.
91. 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 71.
93. The number of commercial broadcasting stations on the air as of October 31,
1974, was 7,737, while during the period between 1923 and 1973 the number of daily
newspapers dropped from 1,977 to 1,566. OWEN, supra note 76, at 64, 93.
94. 473 F.2d at 80.
95. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
96. Id. at 121-31.




vate broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic free-
dom consistent with its public obligations."" In addition, he
reaffirmed that it is the primary responsibility of the broad-
caster to make certain that coverage is fair and adequate."
And, consistent with the Court's teaching in Red Lion, he
quoted the FCC's position that "the right of the public to be
informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government,
any broadcast licensee, or any individual member of the public
to broadcast his own particular views on any matter" is the ba-
sis of the First Amendment's protection.100
Finally, in a recent major pronouncement on the role of the
First Amendment in broadcasting, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that where a broad-
caster has made a reasonable determination that the issues in
a particular program are not controversial, the FCC is not au-
thorized to make its own redetermination to the contrary.10 1
The program in question involved a one-sided presentation of
abuses of private pension plans, which NBC believed to be of
newsworthy interest but not a controversial public issue. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the FCC may not make its own
assessment of the subject matter and order that an opposing
viewpoint must be presented. 10 2
While any general account of the law of media access is prob-
lematic in light of the several elements comprising the First
Amendment, a few generalizations can be made. First, it is
clear that the broadcast media are responsible under the Com-
munications Act for the fair presentation of controversial is-
sues.10 3 While this agency-regulated responsibility has been
held not to violate the First Amendment, courts are likely to
give careful scrutiny to agency action regulating access in this
area.10 Second, it is constitutional for the FCC to require
that broadcasters provide access to certain individuals under
the personal attack and editorial endorsement provisions of
98. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
99. Id. at 103-14.
100. Id. at 112-13, citing Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 15 F.C.C.
1246, 1249 (1949).
101. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
102. Id. at 1133.
103. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 382.
104. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. at 94; Business Executives' Move
for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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the Communications Act.105 However, the broadcast media
cannot be compelled under the First Amendment to accept
paid political announcements so long as they reject all such ad-
vertising and present a balanced coverage of controversial is-
sues. Lastly, the broadcaster is given the responsibility and
the right to select who and what will appear on his station, pro-
vided he does so in a manner consistent with the personal at-
tack and editorial reply provisions of the Fairness Doctrine and
presents a balanced coverage of issues of public importance.o6
B. Statutory Authority for the Rule Under the Communications Act
Upon careful examination of the statutory grant from which
the Commission derives its authority,1 0 7 and subsequent judi-
cial interpretation of its scope, it is clear that the Commission
acted within its authority in promulgating the rule. Although
the Communications Act does not expressly give the Commis-
sion the authority to promulgate such a rule, it does require
the issuance of broadcast licenses so as to serve the public in-
terest, convenience, and necessity.08 In addition, the Commis-
sion is empowered to "make such rules and regulations. .. not
inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out" the
Act. 09 Finally, the Act permits the Commission to promulgate
such rules "as may be necessary in the execution of [the Com-
mission's] functions."o10 While the Communications Act au-
thorizes individual consideration of "each application" by
means of an evidentiary hearing, if necessary,"' this seemingly
direct mandate has been modified by subsequent judicial inter-
pretation.
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.," 2 a landmark case
concerning Commission authority with respect to issuance of
licenses, upheld Commission multiple ownership rules
promulgated under these provisions."i3 As seen in Storer, the
105. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 378-79.
106. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. at 126-30.
107. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
110. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1976).
111. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
112. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
113. Id. at 202-04. The regulations in Storer placed numerical restrictions on the
number of broadcast stations an individual enterprise may own or control. Id. at 193-
95.
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FCC had promulgated a rule providing that no license for an
additional television broadcast station would be granted to any
party where such issuance would "result in a concentration of
control of television broadcasting in a manner inconsistent
with public interest, convenience and necessity."'1 4 As a re-
sult, Storer Broadcasting Company's application for an addi-
tional broadcast station was denied without a hearing, in
accordance with the rule. Storer appealed under section
309(a), arguing that it had been unfairly denied a hearing.
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's action, reasoning that
the rule was within the Commission's rulemaking authority as
necessary to the orderly conduct of its business. In essence,
the court upheld the Commission's authority to deny licenses
to applicants who, in the Commission's view, did not meet the
"public interest" standard. Thus, because the Multiple Owner-
ship Rules regarding media cross-ownership are analogous to
those passed on in Storer, no extension of Storer is required to
conclude that the Commission possessed the statutory author-
ity for the prospective ban.
It can be argued, however, that Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC"' and Stahlman v. FCC,"' two pre-Storer cases which
dealt with newspaper-broadcast combinations, preclude Com-
mission action of this nature. Tri-State Broadcasting involved
an application for a broadcast license by a newspaper owner
that was contested by the appellant on the grounds that com-
mon ownership of a newspaper and broadcast station in the
same locality would give the applicant an unfair competitive
advantage."' The Stahlman case dealt with the question of
whether the FCC had the statutory power to conduct investiga-
tions into the qualifications of newspaper owner applicants for
broadcast licenses."i8 In both cases dicta can be found to the
effect that the Commission has no specific statutory authority
to prohibit newspaper owners from becoming broadcast licen-
sees."s The narrow construction of the Commission's statu-
tory grant relied on in these cases, however, was soon rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in National Broadcasting
114. Id. at 194, citing 47 C.F.R. § 3.636 (1953).
115. 96 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
116. 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
117. 96 F.2d at 566.
118. 126 F.2d at 126.
119. See, e.g., 96 F.2d at 566; 126 F.2d at 127.
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Company v. FCC.'2 0 Rather than limit the Commission's func-
tion to a purely mechanical determination of whether or not
the applicant possessed the requisite character, citizenship,
and financial and technical qualifications,' 2 ' the Court indi-
cated that the Commission's powers were broader, including
"comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast poten-
tialities of radio."'2 2 Hence, the Stahlman case was based on a
more limited view of Commission authority that has since
been rejected by the Supreme Court on more than one occa-
sion.
V
The Court of Appeals Decision
In National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the FCC's prospective rule, finding it to be rational and
within the Commission's statutory authority.'2 3 The court re-
jected all constitutional objections raised, 24 but reversed the
agency's judgment that a case had not been made to justify or-
dering the sweeping across-the-board divestiture originally
proposed.125
The court conceded that the record before the Commission
was barren of any showing that universal divestiture would be
in the public interest. "[A]fter years of study, the record was
essentially inconclusive."126 Nonetheless, the court held that,
even with an "inconclusive" record before it, "the Commission
could not rationally conclude" not to order universal divesti-
ture. 2 7 The court ruled that the Commission was required to
adopt "the presumption that cross-owned stations do not serve
the public interest."128 It asserted that the "presumption" was
supported by three sources: (1) the provision in the Communi-
cations Act that the Commission is to "encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest";129 (2)
120. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
121. See Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d at 127.
122. 319 U.S. at 217.
123. 555 F.2d 938, 947-53 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. Id. at 947-55.
125. Id. at 956-67.
126. Id. at 962.
127. Id. at 965.
128. Id. at 963.
129. Id. at 962-63, citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1934).
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the "policies of the First Amendment"; and (3) the Commis-
sion's policy "that diversification of media sources is of central
importance."1 3 0
Having thus found a "presumption" in favor of universal di-
vestiture, the court next reviewed the competing policies that
the Commission had found to weigh against divestiture and
concluded that none of them was sufficiently persuasive in its
view to outweigh the "presumption."1 3 ' While conceding that
any benefits from divestiture may be speculative, the court
held that the Commission was compelled to order divestiture
of all affiliated broadcast stations and newspapers in the same
locality. 3 2
A. Did the Court Substitute Its Own Judgment for that of the
Agency?
After years of encouraging the common ownership of news-
paper-broadcast combinations in the same community, the
FCC initiated rulemaking proceedings to decide if changed
conditions warranted revision of the multiple ownership
rules.13 3 The Commission was interested in determining if this
was necessary to promote diversity 34 or otherwise comport
with the public interest standard.' Two principal factors cau-
tioned against overzealous action in this area: (1) the inher-
ently disruptive effects of divestiture1 36 and (2) the absence of
evidence of specific abuses or public interest harm in the rec-
ord which would warrant across-the-board divestiture.3 7
Thus, the question was whether diversity should be considered
as controlling or whether other competing policies, such as the
avoidance of disruption of service, should outweigh diversity in
certain circumstances.
In evaluating what steps should be taken regarding existing
cross-owned stations, the Commission fashioned a new divest-
iture rule. This rule reflected the Supreme Court's observation
that the statutory public interest mandate might not be met
130. Id. at 963.
131. Id. at 963-65.
132. Id. at 965-67.
133. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 346 (1970).
134. FCC, Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 30 Fed. Reg. 9660,
1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
135. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
136. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 348 (1970).
137. See Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
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when "the publisher of the sole newspaper in an area applied
for a license for the only available radio and television facili-
ties, which, if granted, would give him a monopoly of that
area's major media of mass communication."" The rule re-
quired divestiture of all newspaper-broadcast combinations
which in the agency's view had an effective monopoly over lo-
cal mass media.13 9
The court of appeals has conceded that in fashioning the di-
vestiture rule in the absence of evidence of abuses, the Com-
mission necessarily had to rely primarily on policy, not factual,
considerations.14 0 However, rather than defer to a decision
based on competing policy judgments, an area where adminis-
trative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight
by appellate courts,141 the court of appeals approached these
policy considerations differently to reach an opposite result.
"The Commission has sought to limit divestiture to cases
where the evidence discloses that cross-ownership clearly
harms the public interest. . . . [We] believe precisely the op-
posite presumption is compelled, and that divestiture is re-
quired except in those cases where the evidence clearly
discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest." 4 2
This was improper, for it is well established that a reviewing
court is not "empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency." 43 It is the agency that is charged with assessing
the relevant public interest, "both existing and foreseeable,"
and the court may not substitute the Commission's balance
with "one more nearly to its liking."'" It appears that the court
of appeals exceeded the proper role as a court of review
vis-A-vis administrative agencies.14
138. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959).
139. Newspaper-broadcast combinations unaffected by this rule were permitted to
continue. However, the Commission retained its longstanding ad hoc policy that a
showing of specific abuses arising out of cross-owned combinations would result in a
forfeiture of the license.
140. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 957 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
141. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1946).
142. 555 F.2d at 966.
143. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974),
quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
144. Permian Basin Air Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968).
145. The court recognized the FCC's power to ignore the antitrust area. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 965.
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B. Prospective versus Retroactive Application of the Rule
The decision of the court of appeals precluded the FCC from
distinguishing between retroactive and prospective application
of its rule, and in doing so it exceeded its proper role as a court
of review. Having concluded that it was reasonable for the
Commission to order divestiture in areas of effective media
monopoly, the court extended the order, holding that the Com-
mission was compelled to reach that conclusion under all cir-
cumstances.146 In limiting divestiture to effective monopoly
situations, the Commission decided as a matter of policy that
an attempt to promote diversity through divestiture in
non-monopoly situations did not outweigh the likelihood of
harm occasioned by the disruption of existing services. 47 The
court of appeals disagreed with this assessment, but failed to
explain why the Commission may not properly make this dis-
tinction. It held that for the FCC to do so was irrational and in
violation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. 4 s The court thus adopted the po-
sition that if limited divestiture served the public interest,
across-the-board action must necessarily do so, regardless of
the attendant circumstances.
The position of the court of appeals is untenable for several
reasons. First, such a decision necessarily involves a weighing
of policy considerations, a task reserved for informed agency
judgment and removed from the proper scope of judicial re-
view.149 Second, one cannot characterize the Commission's po-
sition as irrational merely because, based on the record and on
its informed judgment, it chose to treat effective monopolies
but not diversified markets as presumptively suspect. Third,
the great weight of authority supports the conclusion that pro-
spective application and retrospective application of rules
mandate differing policy considerations. For example, in
changing policies the Commission has frequently
grandfathered previously existing combinations.' It has done
146. Id. at 966. See text accompanying note 138, supra.
147. Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1078. The Commission's concern for
disrupting existing service in this rulemaking proceeding went beyond, of course, any
private interests of established licensees; it also focused upon the interruption of serv-
ice to the viewing and listening public. Id. at 1078, 1080.
148. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
149. Permian Basin Air Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968).
150. E.g., Revision of FM Broadcast Rules, 23 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1801, 1831-39 (1962)
(adopted FM table of assignments with grandfathering of existing stations that do not
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so specifically in establishing new rules and policies to pro-
mote diversification of ownership. 51 The retroactive-prospec-
distinction is expressly incorporated in existing multiple own-
ership rules.'52 In some cases the Commission has expressly
referred to the "inherently disruptive consequences of divesti-
ture." 5 3 In other cases it has grandfathered without any such
references. Until now no court has held that grandfathering re-
quires any special justification. 5 1 Prospective rules permit leg-
islators to respond to "the felt needs for regulating . .. through
familiar administrative devices, while at the same time ...
[satisfying] the dictates of fairness by affording sanction for
enterprises theretofore established."5 5 If statutes are ambigu-
ous as to whether they are to apply retroactively, they are pre-
sumed "in the absence of clear expression to the contrary to
operate prospectively. ... In some cases, the courts have
forbidden agencies to give retroactive effect to a new rule on
conform to antenna height or broadcast power); Distribution of Television Broadcast
Signals by CATV Systems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 784 (1966) (rules limiting signal carriage by
cable television systems with grandfathering of non-conforming systems already in op-
eration); Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 185 (1972) (revision of
cable signal carriage rules with grandfathering of non-conforming existing systems).
The term "grandfathered" refers to a specific application of the rule in question that
permits existing combinations to continue in operation as though exempt.
151. See Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations,
45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964); Hearings on Applications for Second VHF Station, 3 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 909 (1964); Interim Policy on Television Multiple Ownership, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 271 (1965); Multiple Ownership of Television Broadcast Stations, 12 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 1501, 1507 (1968); Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM & TV Broadcast Stations,
22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970).
152. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 n.8; 73.240 n.8; 73.636 n.8 (1979).
153. E.g., FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting (Order No. 37, Dkt. No. 5060) (1941) at
67; Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Signals, 18 F.C.C. 288, 292
(1953); Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by CATV Systems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
789 (1966); Diversification of Control of CATV Systems, 22 F.C.C.2d 833, 835 (1970).
154. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1943); Committee for Open
Media v. FCC, 533 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505
F.2d 320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 227-28
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 55, 56 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 297 F. Supp. 784, 785-86 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
155. United States v. Maher, 307 U.S. 148, 153 (1939). See also Buckeye Cablevision,
Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1967); when an agency acts prospectively, it
has broad discretion to experiment, innovate, or change direction. See Frontier Air-
lines, Inc. v. CAB, 439 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV
v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1962); American Airlines v. CAB, 192 F.2d 417
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
156. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938). Accord, Claridge Apartments Co. v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412,
414 (6th Cir. 1974).
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the ground that to do so would be unfair."' Additionally, to
avoid retroactivity, agencies make policy through the
"quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the fu-
ture."5 e
In keeping with this policy, the Commission's longstanding
practice has favored prospective rulemaking. It has often
adopted prospective rules without imposing them retroactively
to require divestiture by existing licensees.i5s In the present
rulemaking proceeding, the Commission acted prospectively
as prescribed by the Supreme Court in Chenery;o6 0 the court of
appeals, however, held it was "irrational" for it to do So.16 1
C. Diversity An Irrebuttable Presumption?
Because of First Amendment considerations, the court of ap-
peals held that cross-ownership must be presumed to be con-
trary to the public interest standard of the Communications
Act. The presumption must be given controlling weight over
157. See, e.g., Retail, Wholesale, and Dept. Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. E&B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1960).
158. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
159. The Commission's "Chain Broadcasting Regulations," promulgated in 1941,
generally grandfathered ownership by radio networks of individual stations. The Com-
mission stated that it might have acted differently if this question had arisen before
such ownerships had actually come into being. Under the circumstances, however, it
ordered divestiture only where two AM stations were licensed to the same network in
the same area, or where the available facilities were so few or so unequal that the
network had essentially no competition. FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting (Order
No. 37, Dkt. No. 5060) (1941). In 1953, the Commission limited the number of AM, FM
and TV stations which could be under common control. It deliberately set these limits
at a level that would not require extensive divestiture because it believed this would
be "unduly disruptive." Report and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 292 (1953). In the few in-
stances when the limits were exceeded, divestiture was dealt with case by case. Id. at
295.
When the Commission first adopted rules which prohibited a single party from own-
ing two or more AM radio broadcast stations in the same area, Multiple Ownership of
Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943), approximately 20 existing com-
binations were required to divest on a case-by-case basis. FCC Eleventh Annual Re-
port, at 12 (1946). However, in 1964, when the Commission amended its rules to reflect
stricter and more precise standards for determining prohibited overlap (AM, FM or
TV), no divestiture was required of the numerous existing combinations. Multiple
Ownership Rules (Dkt. No. 14711), 45 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1964). Nor did the Commission
require divestiture in 1970, when it adopted rules prohibiting common ownership of
television and radio stations in the same market. Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1910) as modified 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
160. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
161. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 965 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
all other public interest factors. 2 ' In doing so, the court ele-
vated into binding law what had previously been considered
only an important component of the public interest standard.
In reaching this conclusion the court failed to observe the
"venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are
compelling indications that it is wrong."16 Whether there are
such compelling indications can be determined by an evalua-
tion of the FCC's reasoning in light of policies embodied in the
public interest standard of the Communications Act.16 4
The diversification policy adopted by the Commission was
drawn from both First Amendment and anti-trust considera-
tions. Both the courts and the Commission recognize that the
public interest standard invites reference to First Amendment
principles"' and anti-trust policies.6 6 However, the Supreme
Court has never suggested that the First Amendment compels
a virtually irrebuttable presumption against cross-ownership.
The court of appeals required the Commission to adopt this
controlling presumption because of its view that the Communi-
cations Act, the First Amendment, and the importance of the
Commission's diversification policy compel the presumption
that cross-owned stations do not serve the public interest. 6 7
There is nothing in the Communications Act or its legislative
history which mandates this sweeping conclusion. Congress
chose to leave such questions to the informed discretion of the
Commission. 6 8
The declaration of the court of appeals that diversification
must be given controlling weight in the rulemaking proceeding
is also inconsistent with its own past recognition of the FCC's
discretion in this area.16 9 The court has consistently stated
that "[d]iversification is a factor properly to be weighed and
balanced with other important factors."o7 0 Diversification was
162. Id.
163. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
164. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-22 (1973).
165. Id. at 122.
166. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959).
167. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 963.
168. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. at 122.
169. Contrary to its holding concerning diversity, the court of appeals recognized
that antitrust policy is only one component of the public interest standard, and that
the Commission had discretion not to give it prima facie effect. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 965 n.107.
170. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 n.36 (D.C. Cir.
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never presumed, either by the Commission or by the court, to
have controlling weight over other policies. Instead, the court
has previously made clear that it "does not intend impinging at
all upon the Commission's substantive discretion in weighing
factors and granting licenses." 17 ' Yet the decision of the court
of appeals deprives the Commission of the discretion to define
the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard in a
rulemaking proceeding.
D. Should the Court Have Remanded to the Agency?
The decision of the court of appeals raises a significant issue
concerning the court's power to direct a particular remedy
rather than to order the proceeding remanded to the agency for
reconsideration in light of the legal errors the court believed to
exist. The court found that the Commission had erred in in-
sisting that before it could require divestiture of news-
paper-broadcast combinations, it had to find evidence of
abuses.17 2 The court also stated that the Commission had
failed to explain adequately why it did not adopt the presump-
tion that cross-ownership was contrary to the public inter-
est.17 3  However, rather than order a remand for
reconsideration, the court ordered the Commission to adopt a
rule requiring, in effect, across-the-board divestiture.174 The
court thus violated the well-established principle that "the
function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is
laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Com-
mission for reconsideration." 75 The court contravened a basic
principle of appellate review: that administrative public inter-
est determinations, unless mere formalities, may be made only
by the agency, and not by a reviewing court."'7 The holding is
also in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's language in
1971). See also Fidelity Television v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 709, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926
(1975).
171. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d at 1212 n.33.
172. "Having evaluated the policies and record presented to us, we hold that the
Commission erred in concluding that the other policies it advanced required it to find
evidence of harm before ordering divestiture." National Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 962.
173. Id. at 963.
174. Id. at 966-67.
175. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952), citing FCC v. Pottsville Broad-
casting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). Accord, FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
176. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). Accord, NLRB v. Food Store Em-
ployees Union, 417 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974).
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FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., where it was held that a
court of review
may thus correct errors of law and on remand the Commission
is bound to act upon the correction. . . . But an administrative
determination in which is embedded a legal question open to
judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative
agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the
legislative policy committed to its charge.17 7
Upon identification of the legal error, the court had
exhausted the only power which Congress gave it. At this
point the Commission was again charged with the duty of judg-
ing the application in the light of 'public interest, convenience,
or necessity' . . . . The Court of Appeals cannot write [its
views] into the statute as an indirect result of its power to scru-
tinize legal errors. . . . Such an implication from the curtailed
review allowed by the Communications Act is at war with the
basic policy underlying the statute.17 8
The rule confining a reviewing court's role to identification of
legal errors, besides preserving the "integrity of the adminis-
trative process,"" protects against the possibility that law will
be made on the basis of a court's misapplication or misunder-
standing of agency policies, or an inadequate consideration of
the relevant public interest factors. On remand the Commis-
sion might have formulated a different rule or decided that a
rule was inappropriate in light of the appellate court's legal in-
terpretations. If the agency is not given a chance to repair
non-legal mistakes, whether the court's or its own, the contin-
gencies of judicial review and litigation, rather than the public
interest, will be decisive factors.' Thus, when the court de-
creed that the Commission must adopt a rule requiring divesti-
ture of all co-located, cross-owned newspaper-broadcast
combinations, it usurped an administrative function.'
If allowed to stand, the decision of the court of appeals would
have radically altered the Commission's rule. Because the ma-
jority of the combinations affected had been grandfathered
under the version adopted by the Commission,'8 2 the court's
decision amounted to a rewriting of the rule.8 s
177. 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940) (citations omitted).
178. Id.
179. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, 417 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
180. 309 U.S. at 145-46.
181. FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952).
182. Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046.




The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting"' dealt with the three principal
issues raised in the development of the case and settled the
policy questions that remained unclear in the opinion of the
court of appeals. The issues addressed were (1) the Commis-
sion's statutory authority under the Communications Act; (2)
the decision of the court of appeals and the proper scope of the
divestiture order; and (3) the constitutional issues.
The Court resolved the question of the Commission's statu-
tory authority on the basis of Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United
States.8 s The Court noted that section 303(r) of the Communi-
cations Act provides that the Commission shall make "rules
and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of [the Act]."'8" As long as such regulations are
based on permissible factors and are otherwise reasonable,
they will be upheld. Citing Storer and National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States,s' the Court reaffirmed its earlier position
that if the applicant does not meet the minimum standards es-
tablished by the Commission, the Commission may deny the
license without further inquiry. 88 The Court also rejected the
argument that the Commission lacked the statutory authority
to promulgate regulations that would have an impact on com-
munications media outside of broadcasting. This argument,
the Court stated, "undersells the Commission's power to regu-
late broadcasting in the 'public interest.' """9 The Court inter-
preted the Congressional delegation of power broadly, pointing
out that the Commission has a great interest in promoting "di-
versification of control of the media of mass communica-
the Commission the discretion to apply the rule prospectively only. In doing so, it had
also raised the diversity issue to the level of a controlling presumption in license allo-
cation. Moreover, rather than remand to the Commission for possible reconsideration
in light of the court's decision, the court in effect required the Commission to order
across-the-board divestiture.
184. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
185. 240 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
186. 436 U.S. at 793, quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
187. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
188. 436 U.S. at 793.
189. Id. at 794.
No. 3]1 573
tion."o9 0 Moreover, the Court also stated that First
Amendment principles and antitrust considerations may prop-
erly be weighed to determine where the public interest lies.
"[TIhe 'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference
to First Amendment principles, . . . and, in particular, to the
First Amendment goal of achieving 'the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.'"191 In short, the Court reaffirmed that regulations
which are reasonable and based on permissible public interest
goals will be upheld.192
The Court overruled the holding of the court of appeals that
the Commission's order was arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act.193 The court of appeals had
held that a rational basis did not exist for treating existing
combinations more leniently than combinations seeking
licenses in the future or for requiring divestiture of the sixteen
egregious cases while allowing other existing combinations to
stand.1 94 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Com-
mission that the limited divestiture order was the result of a
rational weighing of competing policies' 95 and was designed to
afford "the best practicable service to the American public."9 e
Among the reasons recognized by the Court for allowing ex-
isting combinations to stand were avoidance of disruption of
the stability and continuity of the industry, the possibility of a
decrease in local ownership, and, significantly, the legitimate
renewal expectation of a licensee with a record of meritorious
service.x19
The Court also agreed with the Commission that it acted rea-
sonably in not giving controlling weight to the presumption
against cross-ownership in the Commission's decision against
across-the-board divestiture. Disagreeing with the court of ap-
peals, the Supreme Court stated, "the weighing of policies
under the 'public interest' standard is a task that Congress has
delegated to the Commission in the first instance," and nothing
190. Id.
191. Id. at 795, citing CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973),
and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
192. 436 U.S. at 796.
193. Id. at 803. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1946).
194. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 965-66.
195. 436 U.S. at 803.
196. Id. at 804, citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074 (1975).
197. 436 U.S. at 805.
574 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP
in the First Amendment mandates that such a policy should be
controlling in all circumstances.198
The most significant part of the Court's opinion, however,
deals with the constitutional issues. It is the first major state-
ment by the Court on the respective roles of the print and elec-
tronic media since Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCCl9 9 and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.2 0 0 Those cases made
clear that different First Amendment protections and restric-
tions were to be accorded the two media. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting reaffirmed the Court's earlier
views in these areas and suggested that when the rights of
publishers, broadcasters, and the public confront each other as
they do here, it is the right of the public to know which
prevails. A second and related point is that the case represents
a potentially significant impingement on the First Amendment
rights of newspaper publishers.
Persuasive constitutional arguments in opposition to the
prospective ban take three forms. The National Association of
Broadcasters and the American Newspaper Publishers Associ-
ation assert that the prospective ban is generally violative of
newspaper publishers' First Amendment rights. More specifi-
cally, they say that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment
to promote diversification by prohibiting ownership of
co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. 2 01 They argue
that the rationale relied on in support of the rules is at odds
with the fundamental thrust of the First Amendment. Under
the guise of creating diversity in the media, the rules are based
on the assumption that certain interests are too influential in
public matters. The proposed solution would be to silence
those interests so that a more balanced spectrum of views will
be aired.2 0 2 The First Amendment, it is argued, is based on the
opposite belief. Free discussion of matters of public concern
flourishes best in a truly open forum, without governmental in-
tervention. "IT]he concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
198. Id. at 810.
199. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
200. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
201. 436 U.S. at 799.
202. In discussing alternate methods for regulating debate, the court of appeals
noted: "One way to attempt to equalize debate is by boosting the power of the weaker
voice; another way is by reducing the power of the dominant one." National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 950 n.32.
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relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment. ... "203 The prospective ban, it is argued, cannot be jus-
tified as an attempt to further diversity in broadcasting,
because the net effect would not be to increase the number of
voices in broadcasting. Trading among broadcasters of local
stations for distant stations or simply ceasing publication of lo-
cal newspapers would bring about full compliance with the
regulations without any corresponding increase in diversity.
The Court, however, rejected this argument, relying on Red
Lion2 0 4 and Miami Herald,2 0 5 and the "special problems [of the
electronic media] not present in the traditional free speech
case."206 The Court reasoned that enhancement of the quality
of coverage of public issues in broadcasting "may be permissi-
ble where similar efforts to regulate the print media would not
be."2o7 Accordingly, it reaffirmed its earlier holdings, maintain-
ing that the public interest standard does not restrict the
speech of would-be broadcasters; rather, it "preserves the in-
terests of the 'people as a whole . . . in free speech.' "208
The second argument advanced by opponents of the new
regulation is based on the assertion that it is unconstitutional
to condition receipt of a broadcast license on forfeiture of one's
right to publish a newspaper. This argument relied primarily
on Speiser v. Randall20s and Elrod v. Burns,2 10 two free speech
cases that the Court distinguished in rejecting the claim. The
Court distinguished these cases on the ground that they dealt
with content-related restrictions on speech. The effect of the
regulations in issue, the Court stated, "is to promote free
speech, not to restrict it."2 11 The Court also added that a pub-
lisher need not forfeit anything to acquire a license for a sta-
tion in another community.2 1 2
Finally, the opponents of the rule contend that under it
newspaper publishers are being unfairly singled out for more
203. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
204. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
205. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
206. 436 U.S. at 799.
207. Id. at 800.
208. Id., citing Red Lion v. FCC, 496 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
209. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser, veterans were denied a special property tax
exemption solely as a result of their failure to subscribe to a loyalty oath.
210. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod involved the issue of the political patronage system,
where certain employees were discharged on the basis of their political affiliation.
211. 436 U.S. at 801.
212. Id.
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restrictive treatment under the First Amendment when apply-
ing for a broadcast license.213 Relying on Grosjean v. American
Press Co.,214 they argue that discriminatory measures of this
type have been specifically rejected by the Court. In Grosjean,
the Court held unconstitutional a tax on advertising revenues
imposed only on newspapers with circulations over 20,000.
There the Court stated that the "First Amendment . . . was
meant to preclude the national government . .. from adopting
any form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or
their circulation."2 15 Moreover, Justice White's words in Miami
Herald support this view: "the balance struck by the First
Amendment with respect to the press is that society must take
the risk that occasionally debate on vital matters will not be
comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not be ex-
pressed."216
The Court was unsatisifed with these arguments, however,
reasoning that newspaper publishers are being treated in the
same way under the rule as other owners of the media of mass
communication.2 17 Just as radio and television station owners
have for some time tolerated a prohibition upon ownership of
co-located broadcast stations, so must newspaper owners. In
addition, the effect of the tax in Grosjean was to limit the circu-
lation of information, where in the instant case the effect is
purportedly "to enhance the diversity of information heard by
the public without on-going government surveillance of the
content of speech."2 18
Because of the limited number of available licenses, the
Commission is forced to choose among many qualified appli-
cants. The new regulations allow it a sensible means to
"[promote] the public interest in diversified mass communica-
tions."219
213. Id.
214. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
215. Id. at 249.
216. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J., concur-
ring).
217. 436 U.S. at 801.
218. Id. at 801-02, citing National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d
at 954.
219. 436 U.S. at 802.
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